







By Eric van Damme and Sjaak Hurkens
July 1998
ISSN 0924-7815Eiidogeiiou~ Price Le~,dei~slli~~~`
Erit' van Danunet Sjaak H3irkens~
Afav 1J~JS
Abstract
~~tr~ consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentixted products
and cletermine endogenously which of 4hc- plaYers will lead and which will follow.
lVhile thP follower role is most attractive for each finn, we show that waiting is more
risky~ for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as
iu fíarsxnyi xnci Selten (1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm
~aill choose to w~ait. Hence, the low cost firtn will ernerge as the endogenous price
leruíer.
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1 Irictroduction
5tandard game theuretic mudels of uligopulv situatiuns impose the order of the mu~.es
exugenonsly, an assrrmFt,iun that was aheadv criticized in Vun Stackelberg (1934), well
I~efure game theory invaded t-he field uf indrtstrial organization. Von Stackelberg yointe~d
uiu that pla~~ers have preferences over which role (leader or folluwer) to plav in the game
and he argued that a stable equilibrium wuuld result only if the actual rule assignment
wuiild Le cunsistent with these preferences. As Vun Stackelberg argued, in many situa-
tiuns buth d~iupolists prefer the same role so that a stable situatiun does not appear to
esist. In ~articular. Von 5tackelberg shuwed that a plaver benefits from taking the role
uf leader and he argrted that frequently a fight - a Starkelberg war - will arise as to
~~'hu will assume this leadership role.
l~'hile it is indeed tnre that, under general conditions, a duopolist prefers to move
first rather than to move simultaneous, it should nut necessaril,y be conclude~d that
the leadership rule is the must preferred one: a player might benefit even more if the
uther ~la~~er muves first. As is well-known, this lat,ter state uf affairs arises under price
cum~etitiun ~t~hen pruducts are sitbstitutes (See Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Dowrick
(19i}6) and Gal-Or (1985)). The result follows from the fact that reaction curves are
inrreasing in this case and the basic intuition can be easily seen when firms are identical.
First uf all une nutices that the price uf the leader p~ is larger than the ~ïash equilibrium
hrice p~ sinre the leader's tutal profit, taking into accormt. the rival's optimal reaction,
is increasing in his price at the Nash equilibrium. Since the fullower's reaction curve is
Hatter than the -15 degree line, the fulluwer's price pF is smaller than pr'. Consequently,
Tr~(pc pr) ]~r(pr. pr.) -~L(pc p~) ]~L(p~ pr) )~a(pN pN) (The first inequality
fullows since pF is on the fvllower's reactiun curve, the second since the leader profits
frum a higher hrice of the fulluwer, and the last since the leader cuuld have chosen pN
instead uf pr'.) Hence. if firms are identical, each firm prefers following above leading,
while anv seqitential urder is preferred above muving simultaneoirsly. By cuntirnrity, these
hreferenres remain when differences between the firms are not too large.Given that each player prefers fullowing abuve leading and given that any sequential
urdering uf the moves is unanimously preferred abuve muving simultaneuusl}-. the qiies-
tiun arises which player will hold out and which one evill muve first.' ~~'hich urdering
w-i11 arise when the urder of the moves ís determined strategically by the players'. ~~'hich
diiopulist will decide to becume the price leader? It is thia qnestion that we address
in this paper. We consider a duopoly situation with differentiated substihttaLle prod-
ucts and linear demand. The demand structure is svmmetric acruss firms, but firms are
asymmetric as far as the costs are concerned: one firm is more efficient than the other
and has lower marginal costs. Obviously, at least une aspmmetry is needed tu make a
definite prediction; if the situation would be fully symmetric then the hvu possible se-
quential orderings would be indistinguishable. The question we address then is whether
the efficient or the inefficient firm will become the price leader.
The formal model that we use to solve this prublem has been introduced in Hamiltun
and Slutsky (1990). It allows firms to move, i.e. to choose a price, either early ur lat-e.
Choices within a period are simultaneous but if one firm moves early and the uther
rnoves late, the lattet' is informed about the former's price before making its rhuire.
Since following confers advantages each player is tempted to move late, but obvioitsly
the situation in which buth move late is not an eqnilibrium, since this wuuld result in the
Nash payoffs and then each player would have an incentive to move early. Specifically.
the game has two equilibria corresponding to the two possible seque~ntial orderings uf
the moves and the players have uppusite preferences about these equilibria. In uur view.
the question uf who will take up the most preferred rule amounts to solving the problem
uf which player is willing to take the largest. risk in waiting and we formally anscver t.his
questiun by using the risk-dominance cuncept. frum Harsanyi and Selten (1988). which
alluws une tu qicantify the risks involved. The conclttsion is that waiting is more risky
for the luw cust firm, hence, the efficient firm will emerge as the pt'ice leader and the less
effirient firm will take up the mure favurable folluwer role-
One can conceive of alternative ways of selecting among the two Stackelberg equilibria.
One way would be tu look at which player would benefit must by muving late. Denutinghlay~er i's payoff as a leader (resp. followe~r) by G~ (resp. hti), une ran argrte that if
F-h,~F';-h;.
then the eq,rilibrirrm in ~a~hirh i Leromes the fulluwer is must fucal since that pla~~er
has must tu gain frum fulluw-ing and henre that players will ruurdinate on this une.
Alternativelv. une might. argrre that the eqnilibrinm in which total prufits are highest is
must fural, henre, that i will fulluw if and unlv if
F~L;1F;fL~.
Clearly, this latter ineqnalit~~ is eqnivalent tu the first, so that buth appruaches wortld
predirt the same leadership pattern. Buth these appruaches are essentially based on an
idea uf rullertive ratiunality, sinre it is assitmed that players are able to solve the coor-
dinatiun pruhlem. Oru appruarh is pnrely individualistíc since each firm onl,y takes into
arrurmt it's uwn expected prufit and this is whv we prefer this appruach. Nevertheless,
it is guud tu point uut that in this partiritlar instanre our approach pruduces the same
uittcume: the ahuve inequalities are satisfied when z is the high cust firm. Hence, all
three ahpruaches lead tu rhe runclnsiun that the effiirient firm u~ill lead.
Orn paper thrts pruvides a game theuretic j,tstificatiun for price leadership by the effi-
rient ur duminant firm. The traditiunal indrtstrial urganizatiun literatnre has emphasized
prire leadership in general and leadership L}~ the dominant firm in particular. Scherer
and Russ (1J90) puint tu the cigarette, steel, autumubile, read~~-to-eat;cereal and gaso-
line ind,tstries as markets where price leadership has been ubserved: one firm annottnres
its prire change in ad~.anre and the other firms fulluw. The traditional literature has
emphasized that leadership alluw-s firms to better courdinate their prices and that it.
resnlts in higher prires and luwer cunsnmer stuplus, thus raising pussible antitrust, con-
rerns. Huwever, that literature is not so clear un which firm will take np the leadership
rule. Fur example. :~farkham (1951) in his seminal paper runrlnded un the une hand
that "... prire 'leadership' in a dominant firm market is not simpl~~ a naotLus o~etnndi
designed tu circnmvent prire rumpetitiun amung rival sellers but is instead an inevitable
runseqnenre uf the industr~~''s structrtre, tvhile un the uther hand he stated that `'... ina large number uf indnstries which du not cuntain a partial munuNulist. the prire leader
is freqitently Lut nut ahvavs the largest 6rm.~~ Similarly. Scherer and Russ (1990) lisr as
distinguishing characteristirs uf (barometric) prire leadership ".-. urrasiunal rhanges in
the identity uf the ptire leader (whu is likely in any rase tu be une of the largest sellersj.~~
~Ve believe that the risk cunsideratiuns that we stress in uiu paper might shed sume light
un these iss~tes of prire leadership in practire.
The present paper is part uf a small but, gruwing literature that aims at endugenizing
and identifving the prire leader. The ulder part of this literatitre (represented b~- Buyer
and ~lurea[tx (1987). Duwrick (1986) and Gal-Or (1985)) cunchtdes in negative tune:
imless the difference between t.he firms is sufficientl~- large, each prefe['s the satne rule.
hence there is a runfiict that cannut be resolved. :Vlore recent papers, huwever. shu~a
that such a conflict need not arise when there are rapacitp constraints. The reasun is
that the limited raparitV reduces the incentive tu itndercut the leader's price. Denerkere
and Kovenuck (1992) consider price cumpetitiun fur homogeneuns pruducts fur given
exugenuus capacities and show t.hat, while the large firm is indifferent between leading
and fullowing, the small firm strictly- prefers to folluw. Hence. Denerkere and Kuvenurk
(1992) runclude that the large firm will lead. Furth and Kuvenock (1992) extend the
study uf Deneckere and Kovenork (1992) tu the case of differentiated prudurts and sho~~'
that there will Le agreement abuttt the chuice of rules if caparities are suffiriently asy-m-
metrir: the large fit'm will lead. ~Vhen rapacities are sVmmetric, however. there might be
a conflirt again sinre each player will strictlV prefer the follower rule. A similar result is
ubtained by Canoy (1996). He considers Bertrand-Edgeworth rumpetition with differen-
tiated guuds. henre capacities are endogenouslv determined. He shuws that a~hen firms
have different marginal rusts and pruducts are cluse enuugh substitutes, the ineffirient
firm will Nrefer tu lead while the effiirient firm prefers tu fullow, su that again nu runfiict
arises.
In a rumpaniun paper (Van Damme and Hurkens (1996)) we ronsider a similar ques-
tion tu the one considered here fur the case where firms chouse quantities instead uf
prires. This is the case uf rlassiral Starkelbetg leadership where firms might fight tuJ
ubtain the preferred rule of leadership. In that case, the follower rule is least preferred,
each firm prefers leading t.o pla,ying simultaneousl}- and playing simttltaneouslv tu fulluw-
ing. We furus un the case of humogeneous prodttcts with linear demand and constant
marginal custs and shucv that risk cunsiderations impl,y that also in that case the low rost
firm will emerge as the leader: it is mure t'iskv fur the high cost firm to cummit itself to a
qitantit}~ and, therefure, that firm will decide to folluw. Hence, the identit,y uf the leader
is independent uf w~hether prices or quantities are the strategic variables. The efficient
firm ubtains the preferred rule when cumpetition is in quantities while the inefitcient firm
will ubtain that rule when there is price cumpetition. It should be remarked that the
prire rumpetitiun case is easier tu handle analvtically than the one where competition
is in ~7iiantities.
The remainder of this paper is urganized as follows. The ttnderlying duopol,y game as
well as the actiun rommitment game frum Hamilton and Shttskp (199U) are described in
Sectiun 2, where alsu the relevant notation is introduced. Section 3 describes the specifics
uf the risk duminance cunrept (Harsan,yi and Selten (1988~) as it applies to this context.
The main resiilts are derieed in Sectiun 4. 5ertiun 5 shuws that a shortcut, based on risk-
duminanre in the restrirted game where each player can only chouse between committing
tu his leader price and waiting, wuuld have given the wrung resiilt, and arg7tes that this
is beca~tse the restrirted game dues nut provide a faithftil descriptiun uf t.he actual risks
invulved. Sectiun 6 uffers a brief conclusion.
2 The Model
The imderl~'ing linear price setting duupoly game is as folluws. There are two firms, 1
and 2. Firm i produres proditct i at a cunstant marginal rust ~~, ~ 0. The gouds are
imperfect substit~ttes and the demand fur guud i is given L`'
~~(Ps,Pi) - 1 - p; f ap„
where U G n G l. Firms chuose prices simultaneuusly and the pt'ufit of firm i is given by
u;(p,.p~) - (p; - c,)U,(p,.p~). We assnme that 1 1 ry 1 r.2 1 0, hence firm 2 is more(ï
efficient than firm 1. The best reply uf pla~-er j against the Yrice p; uf pla~.er i is nniq~le
and is given bp
1 f np; f r~
bi(P~) - ~ (2.1)
The unique maximizer of the fnnctiun p, H 11;(p;.bl(p;)) is denuted L~- p; (firm i s
leader ~rice). ~Ve also ~i~rite p~ fur the price that j will rhuose as a~rire fullu~~~er.
p~ - G~(p;). and L; - u,(p~', p~ ) and F; - u;(p~ . p~'). We write (p'i Pz ) fur the imique
Nash eqnilibriilm uf the game and denote plaver i's Ila}~off in this equilibrium by .~'',. Fur
later reference we nute that
L- 2~ Il -~ nr:~ ~(2 - nl)r;
p` - 2(2 - nL)





(2 -F n -~ ar:i -~ (n2 - 2)c;)z
L; -
8(2 - nl)
F, - (4 t 2n - n2 f(2a - a~')r~ f (3n1 --I)c,)Z
16(2 - a~)~
N - (2 f n -f- nr.. ~ (nz - 2)~. )z
(4 - a2)2
One easily verifies that p~ ~ p2 and p~ ~ p2. It alsu readily fullows that
~i ~ p~ i [1~, (2 - )..2)






Henre. each ~la~-er has an incentive to cummit himself (compared tu the simultane-
uus play equilibt'ium) but prefers tu fulluw. Straightfurward cumputations shuw that
f'~ - L~ ~ Rl - 1.1. hence the high cust firm benefits more frum being the fullower than
the low rost firm. Obviuitsly, the above inequalitv is eqnivalent to Lz f F~ 1 h~ f F1.7
henre rutal prufits are larger ~~~hen the efficient firm leads. The qnestiun ~~.e address in
this paper is n'hether the plapers ~~~ill sncreed in rearhing that "efficient' ordering uf the
IYIU`'PS.
Tu investigate which pla,yer will dare to wait when Luth playets have the uppurtlmity
tu du su. we make Itse uf the twu-period nctiorr. cu~nzrrr.itrrr~enl ga~rae that was proposed in
Hamiltun and Slutskv (1990). The rnles are as fulluces. There are twu pet'iuds and earh
~la~~er has tu rhuuse a prire in exactly une uf these periuds. Within a periud, chuires
are simllltaneuns. Lnt, if a player dues nut chuuse to muve in periud 1, then in periud ').
this playrer is infurmed abunt which action his oppunent chuse in periud 1. This game
has pruper snLgames at I- 2 and uln' assltmptiuns implv that all uf these have nniqne
eqltiliLria. ~1'e will anal~~ze the rednced game, gl, that resltlts when these snbgames
are replaced L~' their eqltilibriltm valnes. Furmall~', the strategv set uf player z in rj~ is
Rf U{Ir;} and the payuff fitnctiun is àven h~'
vt(Pé-P~) -(P~ - c~)(1 - P~ f api) (2.4)
~rr;(~~.1~;) - (pè - ~:)(1-~; f ~(1 ~ d~, ~ r~~)~~) (2.s)
t~;(tt'~.P~) - (1 f ay; - c~~)~~-1 (2.6)
u~~(t~'~, tr'~) - N~ (2.7)
It is easil~' seen that q~~ has three Nash eqniliLria in pnre strategies: Either each player
i rummits tu his Nash prire p~ in the first periud, ur une pla,yer i rummits tu his leader
prire p~ and the uther plaver ~~-aits till the secund periud. It. shuuld Le nuted that besides
these pltre eqltiliLria, the game yl admits mixed strateg}' equilibria as we1L (See Pastine
and Pastine (1997).) These mixed eqniliLria will nut t~e ronsidered in this paper, the
reasun Leing that we want tu stick as cluselp as pussiLle tu the general sulntiun pruce-
dltre ulttlined in Harsan}'i and Selten (1988), a procedure that giees precedenre tu plu'e
equiliLria whene~'er pussible.l
IOul} iu tL~~ rav~ ut idr~ntir~al crbts t-liic is not pus.tiible, and tLr proredure wuuld prr~cribe a mixrxl
aralr,~~~ ~.tuilibrium. It ia uot difficiilt tu sLuw tLat xny tnixrrl ar.rteg~ rc{uilibriwu iv risk domitlatrrlAlthuitgh mixed strateg,t' equilibria will not be considered. e-e stress that mixed strate-
gies will pla}' an impurtant rule in what fullows. The reasun is that, in the rase at hand.
a player ~cill typicalh~ be tmrertain aLuut whether the uppunent w-ill rommit ur nut, and
sttrh tmrertainty aLuitt the uppunent's behaviur ran Le expressed Ly a mixed strateg~'.
I,et ra~ be a mixed strateg,y uf player j in the game g~. Becattse uf the linear-qnadratir
sperificatiun uf the game, there are only three "charartet'istics~ uf rnE that are rele~~ant
to play~er i. viz. tu~ the prohabilit}- that player j waits. ~t~ the average prire tu whirh
j cummits himself given that he cummits himself, and v~. the varianre uf this prire.
5pecifirally, it. easilp follows frum (2.4)-(2.7) that the experted payuff uf pla`~er i against
a mixed strategv ïrE7 with rhararteristics (tv7, ~ï~. v~) is given L~~
7Li(~i,7IEJ) - ( 1 - 7V7)(17i - fi)(1 -~e f QÍII)
fw,(P; - ~;)(i -~i f ~~(1 ~ a~i f ~~)~~) (z.a)
vl;(w;, rn,~) -(1 - w.i)(Q~~i~4 i (1 f n~ci - I~i)~~4~
-Fwi~(~ f a ~- nr.~ ~- (a~ - 2)ri)~(~ - a~)~~ (2.9)
Note that tmcertaintp roncerning the price to which j will cummit himself makes it mure
attrartive fur player i~ to wait: v~ contribtttes pusitively to (2.9) and it does nut pla~~ a
role in (2.8). On the uther hand, increasing u~~ clearlp increases the incentive fur player
i tu rummit himself. Finally, increasing Ei~ increases the inrentive fur player i tu commit
himself, beraitse uf the pusitive effect. on i's demand.
3 Risk Dominance and the ~acing Procedure
The roncept uf rtisk donti~n.arECe captttres the intnitive idea that, when plapers du not know
~i'hirh uf twu eqnilibria should be plaped, they will measiire the risk imrolved in playing
each uf these eqnilibria and they will cuordinate expectatiuns on the less risk~~ une, i.e.
un the risk duminant equilibrium of the pair. The furmal definition of risk dominanre
invulves the bit~eïetïzc ~rior and the tmcitag procedure. The Licentrir prior describes the
}it Lutó Iracíenhip equilibria. Srx~ Section fi for more detaiLs.y
hlayers' initial assessment about, the sihtation. As this initial assessment need nut be
an ecptilibríitm uf the game, it cannut cunstitute the lrla}~ers' final vie~~. un the situatiun.
The tracing lrruced,tre is a~rucess that, starting frum given ~riur beliefs uf the lrlapers.
grad,tally adjnsts the ~laVers' plans and expectativns until they are in eq,tilibrinm. It
mudels the thu,tght prucess uf players who, b,y dednctive persunal reflection, tty tu fig-
,ue u,tt what tu play in the sit,tatiun whe~re the initial ,mcertaintv is re~resented bV the
given }rriur. Beluw we describe the mechanisms uf the tracing prucedure as well as how,
arrurding tu Harsanvi and Selien (1988), the initial }rriur shunld be cunstntcted.
It is well knuvm that risk duminance allows a very simple characterizatiun for 2 x 2
games with twu Nash equilibria: the risk dominant equilibrium is that une fur which
the hrud,tct uf the deviatiun lusses is largest. Conseq,tently, if risk duminance could
ahva~.s be decided un the basis of the reduced game spanned by the two eq,tilibria under
runsideratiun (and if the res,tlting relation wuuld be transitive), then the soltttiun could
be fuimd by st.raightfurward cump,ttatiuns. Unfurtunately, this happ,y state of affairs does
nut Yrevail in óeneral. The twu cunce~ts du not always generate the same suhrtiun and
it is well-knuwn that the tiash yruduct uf the deviatiun lusses ma}- be a bad description
uf the nnderlt'ing risk sitnatiun in general. (5ee, Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) for a
sitn~le example.) In 5ertiun 5 we shuw that this is alsu trne fur the game analyzed in
this halrer. In fact, the reditred game anal~.sis prudnres exactly the ulrpusite res,tlt from
rhat uLtained b~~ aY~lving the tracing }rrucedure; it leads tu t.he roncLtsion that the luw
rost firm will fulluw. In Sectiun ~ we explain in detail wh~- the redriced game uffers a bad
descri~tion uf the risk cunsideratiuns. ~~'e nuw pruceed tu formally define the cuncepts
uf the birentric priur and the traring procedrtre needed fur the risk duminance analysis
in the fiill game-
3.1 Bicentric Prior
Let g-(.5'~ .,52. ui , e~i) be a 2-persun game and let s and s' be two eq,tilibria of this game.
~1-e need tu specif~~ the platiers' initial beliefs when ther' are imcertain abuut cvhich of
rhese twu equilibria shuuld be played. Harsan}~i and 5elten (1988) argue as fullows.lu
Pla~-er .j. being Bayesian, will assign a subjective pruLaLility ~~ tu i playing s, and he
will assign the rumplementaty prubability ~~ - 1- z~ tu i pla~~ing .,;. ~~-ith these t~eliefs.
player j t~-ill play the best respunse against the strate~- z~.c; }- ~~s~ that he experts i tu
play and we denute the resulting strategy uf y with 6~(ti~).l Player j, knuwing his priur
~~. knuws which actiun he will play. Pla,yer i, huwever, dues nut knuw .~ exartly and
hence rannot predict exartlv what .j will du. Applying the principle uf insufficient reasun.
Harsanyi and Selten ( 1988) argue that i will runsider s~ to he nnifurmly distriLttted un
[Q 1]. Writing Z; fur a tmifurml,y distribnted randum variable un [0. 1]. pla}~er i tivill.
therefure. believe that he is facing the mixed strategv
m.i - bi(Zi) (a.l)
and this mixed strategy rre~ uf pla,yer j is pla,yer ~'s prior belief abunt j's Lehaviut' in the
situatiun at hand. Similarly, ra; - b,(Z,), where Zt and Z1 are independent. is the priur
belief uf player j, and the mixed strateg}~ pair ~n - (mt, m.i) is called the bicetal~ric ~rior
assuciated with the pair (.5~, s').
3.2 ~acing Procedure
Frum a mathematical puint uf view the traring procedure is a mayping that maps initial
Leliefs intu the set of eqttilibria uf the game. In urder to determine the risk dominant
equiliLrium we will have to apply this mapping unly to the birentric priur descriLed
abu~~e. Huwe~~er, in this sttbsectiun we will define the tracing procedttre fur any initial
heliefs.
Let rn.; be a mixed strategy of plaper i in g (i - 1.2). The strate~v rn, represents
the initial tmrertaint,y uf pla,yet' j abuut i's Lehaviur. Fur C E[0, 1] we define the game
g''"' -(.ti't. S1. ui'"'. v2"') in whirh the payuff ftmctiuns are given by
~Iu grurral pla}er j mn}~ lixve multiple br5t replies in which caae he should play all uf them with
eYtnal probahilitc. Howei-er. in our settin~ with .,trictly quatii-concave profit funrtious t:his happens witó
tero prubahilit~. ,u ~ce rnat' iguure miiltiple b~t repli~.11
t.,,~.
tr, s„ s~) -(1 - t)u,,(s,, trei) f tttt(st, si). (3.2)
Henre, fur t- 1, this game yr~"` coincides with the uriginal game y, while for t- 0 we
have a trivial game in which each player's }~ayoff depends only un his uwn artion and his
uwn Nriur beliefs.'' ~4ite I"" for the graph uf the eqttilibrium currespundence, i.e.
I'n` - {(l, s) : t E~0, 1], s is an equilibrium uf yt'"`}. (3.3)
It ran Le shown that, if g is a generic firrite game. then, for almust any prior rn, this
graph 1''" rontains a tmique distingiiished run~e that connects the unique equilibrinm
vtt~"' uf gt'~"' with an equilibrittm st n` uf y~~"`. (See Schanuel et al. (1991) for details.)
The equilibrinm st~"` is called the litarar trncr. of m.. If pla,yers' initial beliefs are given
by rn and if players~ reasuning }~rocess rurres}~unds to that as mudeled by the tracing
Nruredttre. then Nlayers~ expectatiuns will runverge un the equilibrittm st~'" of y. As in
uttr rum}~aniun ~aper, we will ap}~l}. the tracing procedure tu the infirai.ir, game y'z that
was desrribed in the }rre~-iutts sertiun. For such games. no generalizatiuns of the Schamtel
et al. (1991) results ha~~e been established yet, bnt as we will see in the following section,
there indeed exists a tmiqtte distingitished ctuve in the special case analyzed here. Hence,
the nun-finiteness uf the game y'~ will create nu s~ecial prublems.
3.:3 Risk Dominance
Risk duminanre is defined as fulluws. Cunsider twu equilibria, ,v and s' of y. lise the
runstrnrtiun described in snbsect.iun 3.1 tu determine the bicentrir priur, n~, assuciated
{Luu,rlY .~peaking the pxratneter t might be thought ot as time. With tliia interpret.ation, plaper t
~i...igti~ k-eight 1 - t to his prior belie[s at time t, while lie givrs aeight t to the rraaiuing procc-ss at this
puint iu time. rv timr t- I, when the playerv' actiom are in equilibriwn. the player (ullp trusts the
uidrunie uC the reasoniug pruci~s.~~-ith the pair (s, s'). Then appk the traring prorednre uf snbsection 3.2 tu rn, i.e.
cumpute the linear trace uf this prior, st "'. ~~'e now say that s rrsk dornrainh:e~ s~' if
y'~'"' -.ti. Similarly, s' risk dominares s if s~~'" - s'. In case the uutcume of the traring
~rured~ire is an equilibrium different frum .v ur s'. then neither uf the eqttilibria risk
duminates the uther. Sitch a sitttatiun will, huwPVer, nut urrur in uiu 2-stage artiun
rummitment game, provided t.hat the custs uf the firms are different.
4 Commitment and Risk Dominance
In this sectiun, we prove uur main results. Let j1 be the endugenuits commitment game
frum Sectiun `L. Write .S; fur the pure eqnilibrium in which player i currunits to his
leader price in period 1, S; -(p~, w~), and write B fur the equilibrium in which earh
~layer cummits to his Bertrand price in period 1, B-(p~ ,pz~). We shuw that buth prire
leader equilibria risk dominate the Nash equilibrium and that .SI risk dominates ,S'i when
cz C r.i. The first restilt is quite intiutive: Cummit.ting tu pN is a weakly duminated
strategy and playing a weakly dominated strategy is risky. The yroof of this resitlt is
rurres~undingly- eas~..
Proposition 1 hi y~, 1he price lender cy~iaihbizeeTre ,S, risk dotrr.in.ntes the Naslz rqt~i.lih-
rz~ttn f3 (i - 1.2j.
Proof. ~~'ithunt loss uf generality, we jnst prove that S~ risk duminates B. We first
cum~ute the birentric ~rior that is relevant for t.his risk romparison, starting with the
priur beliefs uf player 1.
Let player 2 believe that 1 plays z2S~~ ~(1 - zi~B~ - zlp~ -~ (1 - zi~p~ . Obviunsly,
if r~l E (0.1). then the nnique best resyonse of ~la,yer 2 is tu wait, 62(;,2~ - w2. Hence,
the ~riur belief uf player 1 is that player 2 will wait with prubability 1, tn1 - u.2.
~~ext. let Nla~~er 1 believe that 2 plays z~S~tf(1-zt)Eiz - ztw2~-(1-zt)pz`. Obviuusly.
waiting vields Nla}~er 1 the ~ash payuff N~ as in (2.3c), irrespertive of the value of zi.
~1-hen r~ 7 0 then rummitting tu a price that is (slightly) above pi yields a strictl}- higherla
payuff, hence, the best response is to r,ummit to a certain price pt(tit), bt(zt) - pt(zt).
The reader easily verifies that pt (z~ ) increases with zt and that p~ (1) - pi'. Cunsequently,
if ttA~ is the priur belief of player 2 then fur the characteristics (wt, pt, vt) uf rn.t we have:
u~i - 0. {~~ 1 p~i', v~ ~ 0.
`ow. let ns t~trn tu the tracing prucednre. The starting puint curresponds tu the best
replies against the priur. OLviuitsly, the nnique Lest response against m.1 is for pla,yer 1
ru cummit tu p~, while player 2's nnique best respunse against, rrri is tu wait. Hence, the
~uiiqite eqitilibrium at f- 0 is St. Since 5't is an equilibrium of the uriginal game, it is
an eqnilibrinm for any t E[0. 1]. Cunseqnentl,y, the distingnished curve in the graph Pm
is the ritrve {(t, S~ ): t E [0, 1~ } and St risk dominates B. p
~1'e nuw tiun tu the risk cumparison of the twu price leader eqitilibria. Again we start.
Ly cump~tting the Licentric priur based un St and ,Sz. We show that each player's prior
belief is that the other pla,yer will commit to a randum price. Let player j believe that i
cummits to p;' with probability ti and that i waits with prubabilit,y 1- F. Waiting yields
u,(tu;, zp,'.~ f ( 1 - r)w,) - zF; f(1 - z)N;.
It is easily seen that cummitting tu the fullower price pF~ resiilts in higher profits, namely
rhe mapping p ~--~ rt~(p.6;(p)) is cuncave and attains its maximum at p~, and since
p~~ E(p,~. p~'). w'e have
rri(p~ ,bt(p~ )) ~ ui(P~ ,bt(1~~)) - N~,
su that
v.~(P~ , zp;' -F (1 - z)wi) ~ 'tt:i(w~i, wp;' -~ (1 - z)'ui,).
Hence, it already fulluws that each player will believe that the oppunent will commit
himself tu sume price. Tu determine this price, nute that cummitting to price p~ yields
vr~(Pi -P~ ~ (1 - z)w;) - (Pi - ~i)~1 - p~ f a(zp;' f (1 - z)(1 ~ api ~ ca)~2)~
Ciaen ~. the uptimal cummitment price p~(z) of player j must satisfy the first urder
~unditiun ' r)r~~(p~, zp~' f(1 - z)m,)~i)p~ - 0, and is, henre, given byI-1
p,(~)
-(i - v)(z - al)pl. t 2tp;~
(-~.1) 2 - a'~(1- ti)
Cunseqnentlt~, buth players expect the uther player tu cummit with pru~ability une.
Fiuthermure, nute that pt (z) ~ p2(w~ fur all z E[0, 1~. since p~ J pl and p~ ~ p.i . This
means that firm 1 expects firm 2 tu cummit tu a lu~~- lnice, while firm ? exhects firm 1
tu cummit tu a high price. Frum
2(2 - a~)(P~ - Pj)
P;(z) - (2 - a~(1 - z))~ ,
une easil~. verifies that p2(t) G p~(z) c 0 since p2~ - p2 C p~` - p~~ c Q. Hence. firm
3's },rice is ex~ected to vary mure than firm 1's price. (See A~~endix A1 fur a furmal
~,ruuf.) ~~e summarize these resttlts in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Player i's bice~t.ttic prior ~rt-~ is fhnt j will corn~m.it to a rrl~t-dom prir.c p~(~)
~mith r,~pectatioraEe~ artd e~ariance v~, wh.ere ~~~~ E~p~', p~~ art.d v~ 1 0. A~loreo~ner, toe Ita~nF~
~it ~~~~z a~ed ti~ G vz.
Nuw, let its tiun tu the tracing procedure. The starting ~oint (the initial equilihriitm)
rurres}runds tu khe Lest re}~ly against the ~riur. Since but,h players ex~ect the uther tu
rummit with probaLility. une and are tmcertain abuut the exact price the uhYonent will
cummit tu, the imiqite Lest re~ly for buth Nla~-ers is tu wait. As I increases player i
attaches mure and mure~ weight (namely t) tu the event that player j will wait. At sume
critical Yuint Í; it must Lecume Yrofitahle tu commit and take the leader rule. ~Ve wil]
shuw that the low rost firm will s~-itch befure the high cust firm will, i.e. that t~ ~ t2.
The intititiun is given by Lemma 1 and the equatiuns (2.8) and (2.9): Since ~layer 1
(the high cust firm) commits tu a higher and less variaLle Yrire, it is relati~.el}' more
attracti~~e fur firm 2 tu cummit tu a Yrice. We elaburate ),elo~~. and relegate the furmal
lxuuf tu the .-1~Yendix.
Recall frurn 5ectiun `2 that the expected payoff uf plaver i deVends unh~ un his action
and the three impurtant characreristics uf the upNunent's (mixed) strategt~. viz. the15
pruLaLilit}~ that the uther plaper waits, the average prire tu whirh the uther player
cummits himself (gi~~en that he rommits himself), and the variance uf that prire. During
the tracing pruredure expectatiuns abu[tt t,he uppunent's strategy change (see sectiun
3.2), ln[t as lung as nu player switches aivay frum waiting, onl~- the prubability that the
uther waits will Le adjusted. The average rummitment price and the variatiun of this
prire du not rhange. Henre, the expertation uf player t at time t, given that no one has
switrhed yet, is given by- the mixed strategy ~n~ -(1 -t)rre~ f tw~. Identifying this mixed
strategy with its important characteristics we will write rrt~ -(t, Fi~, v~). The expected
pa~~uff fur player ~ frum committing and waiting is given in (2.8) and (2.9), respectively.
Fur rn` -(l, t~,, v) define the gain frum rommitting for z as
.y,(nt[) - rrtax u:(p„ rn`) n,(iu„ un,[).
We will shuw that firm 2 always has a higher incentive tu commit himself than firm 1,
i.e. that yz(m~) 7 yr(rrri) fur all t. Sinre the gain uf cummitting is negative at t - 0 and
pusitive at t- 1, this implies that firm 2 will switch befure firm 1 dues.
The formal pt'uuf is di~-ided intu three steps and is given in the Appendix. ~Ve now
pruvide intnitiun fur earh step. In the first step we show that the gain frum committing






iw,(~m,.pi) - a(h~(pi) - ~~~). ~~p~
i.e. the matginal effert un i's prufit uf an increase in j's price is equal tu the price-cust
margin mitltiplied with the marginal increase in demand. Since j will never rommit tu
a prire aLuve pj', b;(p~) G pF. Un the uther hand, if firm i cummits himself he will
(uptimall~.) cummit tu a price aLove pF. The effect uf an increase in p~ is thus larget'
when i rummits himself than when he waits.
Serundl~~, the gain frum rummitting is decreasing in the variability of the price of the
uppunent. This is ~.er}~ inhtitive. ~~'e know frum Lemma 1 that vt G v2 su that firm 1ls
is mure imrertain abuitt the price firm `l will rommit himself tu. Clearl~-. this gi~'es him
more reasun tu wait and less tu cummit.
Finall~-. ~~-e shucv that the luw cust firm has mure incenti~-e tu rummit than a}tig}i
rust firm even if the}~ ha~~e exactly the same expectatiun about the cummitment prire uf
the oppunent. This folluws frum the fact that the high cust firm gains mure frum Leing
the fulluwer than the low cust firm, i.e. that Fr - Lr ~!~i - Lz. The aLu~-e steps can
now be combined tu shuw that, with hr. and vr. as in Lernma 1 we get
yz(t.f~r,vi) ~ g2(r,fi2,vi) ~ gz(t,F~2.~z) ~ yi(t.lrz,~s).
The furmal pruuf is in .Appendix A2. The abuve ineqnalit.ies imply that at an}~ puint in
the tracing procedure player 2 gains mure frum cummitting than firm 1, and, therefure,
it must be player 2 whu will decide tu switch first, i.e. tr 7 t1. Thus. buth pla}-ers
wait till t1 at which puint plaper 2 is exactly indifferent Lehveen waiting and rummitting
uptimallY (to ~1(t2)). The graph of the equilibrinm currespundence exhibits a"vertical"
segment at t2. Any pair of strategies in which firm 1 waits and firm 2 mixes Letween
waiting (with probability ~o) and committing tu pz(t~) (with probabilitv 1- u~) is an
eqirilibrium uf yr~~'n : Firm 2 is indifferent and an,y mixture is therefure a best repl}~.
Firm 1 strictly prefers to wait when w- 1 (since y~(~naz') G yl(~na~~) - 0) and alsu when
ro- 0(since then firm 2 cummits fur sure tu a random price). Becarrse uf linearit}~ (in
u;) firm 1 prefers tu wait for anv ~r' E[0. 1~. From t2 onward, player 2 cummits with
prubabilit}~ 1(brrt changes the cornmitment price cuntinuutrsl,v) and player 2 waits ~cith
prubabilit,y 1. Therefore, the tracing prucedure ends ttp in an equilibrium where player
2 cummits and pla~-er 1 waits. i.e. at S2. This cuncludes the pruuf uf
Proposition 2 The pri.ce leader eq~rilibriiarn .S2 it~ v;h.ich. the low cost fi'rm leads rzsk
rlnrni.~ratcs llac otrrs irr ~uhrr-h Ihe hiyh cost fitm leads.
B~- rumbining the Prupusitions 1 and '2 we, therefore, ubtain onr main resilt:
Theorem 1 "I'hn przce lraider eyviilibv~iurrr in 2uhich the ejjicient firm leads a~~rr,l Ur.e irref-
fi'rirtei fir-rn (nllotus zs lhe tzsk domi.tratat eqraiG.órivem oj th.e enrtogetaons price cnrrr.ntitrn.errt
grtrrte .17
~ute that, if the costs uf firm 1 are not much higher than the cust,s uf firm 2, then
l', ? L1, i.e. the high rust firm makes higher ~rofits (as a prire fullower) in the risk
duminant equiliLrinm than the efficient firm (as a price leader). This seems curiotts
and rurmterintititive at first sight since it cuuld give incenti~~es tu the luw cust firm tu
inrrease its cust (if he rwnld Le aLle tu do that in a rredible way). Huwever, given the
cust stntctitre, waiting is less risky for a high rust firm than for a luw cost firm, and the
ineffiirient firm hrufits frum its "weak" pusitiun.
5 Risk Domiriance in the Reduced Game
~Ve recall that risk duminance alluws a ver,v simple rharacterization for 2 x 2 games with
two ti'ash equilibria: the risk dominant equilihrirtm is that one fur which the ~roduct of
the deviatiun lusses is largest. Cunseqnently, if risk duminance cunld always be decided
un the basis uf the reditred game spanned by the twu equiliLria under consideration
(and if the resttlting relatiun wonld be transitiae), then the sulntion could be found b,y
straightfurward rum~ntatiuns. Let ns yerfurm these cumpntations Lased un the rednced
game where each }rla~-er is restricted tu either committing himself tu his leader's price or
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Table 1: Rednced versiun uf the Yrice cummitment game.
where G;, !V, and F are as in (2.3) and where D; - u;(p,', p~) denutes plaper t's payoff
in the rase uf hrire leader ~rarfare.~ It is easil~. verified that
a~(2 f a ~ ur. ~(nz - 2)r.,)2
L, - N, -
8(2 - n~)(~ - á~)~
~The term "warfarè' iti tivrnewhat mi;placerl Irere sinrc rhecorrespuudiu~ payofFs are higher than the
~~ncu~fs nt ihu n~ual price le.xde,r. i.r. D, ~ G;.18
a~(1 ~ ac., - r~
F; - U, - 16(az - 2)z (5.21
It fullu~rs thar the prud~tct uf deviatiun lusses at St is latger than at .ti'z if and unh~ if
(ct - rz)(2 f 2a -~ (ct f ~'z)(á1 - 1)) ~ 0 (~.3)
which clearl~. hulds sinre ct ) c.z. Risk cunsiderations based un rednred game mial~-sis
tmambig7tuitsl}' point intu the directiun uf the prire leader equilibriitm where the high
cost firm leads. ~~'e see that the resiilt based un the reditced game is the uppusite uf u~tr
res~tlt established in the previuus section, which was based un the fitll cummitment game.
Two issttes arise here: First, the relevance uf the 2 x 2 game, and secund, the character-
izatiun uf risk duminance in 2 x 2 games. The resnlt that the risk duminant equiliLri~tm
is the une at which the prudttct of deviation lusses is largest was pruved Ly Harsan}~i
and Selten (1988, Lemma 5.4.4). To enable the reader a prupet' evalttatiun uf uin w-urk










Table 2: A generir 2 x 2 game.
where at~ ~ a11, btt ~ btz, azz 1 a1z, and 622 ) Gz1 su that ),oth (T, I) and (I3. R) are
p~tre strict ~ash equilibria. Denote by ~~ the probabiGty with which player j rhooses
his fit'st strateg}~ in the mixed eqitilibrium. Then it is easily seen that the priur belief
of pla}~er j(as utttlined in Section 3~ assigns prubability 1- i~ to i pla}~ing his first
strategy. Assiime that ~t f wz G 1. Then each plaper's best reply against his priur is his
first sirateg~-. henre the tracing prucedure fur determining the risk dominant equilibt'ium
starts at (T.L) and sta}~s there: (T.L) risk duminates (B,R). Similarly. (B,R~ is risk
duminant if ~t f:,z ~ 1. ~uw ir is easilr' verified rhar ~t f iz c 1 if and onl~- if
(~~tt - a2t)(bu - ótz) ~ (h22 - ózt)(azz - ai2),19
i.e. if the pruduct uf deviatiun lusses at (T, L) is latger than the product uf deviatiun
lusses at (13, N).
In urder tu illustrate why the reduced game analysis and the fttll game analysis give
different solutions, let us reconsider the bicentric priur in buth approaches in a numerical
exam}~le with extreme vahtes uf the parameters. In part.icular, suppuse a- L ct - 1.
and c1, - p. Sitbstititting these vahtes into (2.2a) and (226) yields ~~ - p~ - pz - 2 and
Ni~ - 3~2. This im~lies that D~ - F~ so that in the reduced game of Table 1, cummitting
tu ~~~- is a ~~~eakly dominant strategv for player 1. Clearly, this means that waiting is
extremely risky for firm 1 and he will, therefore, be the leader in the risk dominant
eqnilibritnn. (Nlure furmally, the product of deviation losses at S2 is zero whjle lt ls
~usitive at S~.)
1~~uw recunsider the full rommitment game analpzed in Section d. If player 1 believes
that 2 wil] cummit to yi with Frobability ti and will wait with probability 1-z, his best
reply is tu rummit to p~(c) - 2 fur all a. Hence, player 2's prior is that pla,yer 1 will
cummit fur sitre to the price 2. On the other hand, player 1's prior is that pla,yer 2 will
rommit tu sume random price between 3~2 and 2. The best replies against the bicentric
t,riur are, therefure, that player 1 waits and that player 2 commits tu pz - 3~2. During
the tracing prucednre the beliefs that 1 will wait and that 2 will commit tu a randum
~rire are reinfurced, and the linear trace mitst be ,52.
Fur general parameters the differences between the two approarhes are not as clear-
ciit as with the extreme numbers used above, bi.tt the differences are still remarkable.
In }rarticitlar, in the fitll game analysis both firms believe that the other will commit for
sure and, therefure, their initial best replies are tu wait. In the reduced game both firms
attach pusitive weight tu the event that the uther will wait. However, the high cost firm
attaches a high Yrubability to the event that the low cust firm will ~3~ait, whereas the low
rust firm unly assigns luw probability tu the event that the high cost firm will wait. The
best replies are, therefure, for the inefficient firm to commit and fur the efficient, firm to
wait. See Table 3 beluw.Priu[' beliefs abuut Initial eqnilibrium strategies uf
pla~~er 1 player 2 pla~-er 1 pla~-er '~
Full Game commit commit wait wait
Redured Game likely to commit likely t.o wait commit wait,
Table 3: Comparing the two approarhes.
~~'e see that the two appruaches differ in two respects: theY pruduce different priurs and
the best replies against the priors are different. The artificial reduction uf the gatne
restrirts play-ers in their choices and forces them to do things they du nut really want
tu du. In particular, it furces players to wait, if that is better than committing to the
leader prire, w-hile we have seen that cummitting tu the fulluwer prire alcvays generates a
higher payuff than waiting. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) emNhasize that the rumpittatiuns
shuuld take intu account all strategies that are best. replies against some mixtttre between
the hvu eqi[ilibrii-tm strategies, and not unly the two equilibrium strategies. Tu fnrther
illustrate why the 2 x`l game describes the risk runsideratiuns very badlv we will nuw
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Table 4: .4nuther rednced versiun uf the price rommitment game.
where 1,,, 1V„ F; and U, are as in Table 1 and .l", - ti.,(p~ ,P~), Y, - u,(p~~.6~(p~~)).
and 72 - u;(b;(pj), pF). In this game players are restricted to cummit to the leader
price, tu cummit tu the fulluwer price or tu wait. Of cunrse, in this game plavers are
still qnite restrirted in their chuices (as rumpared tu the fitll game) but ~r-e will see that
jnst allu~~-ing players to itse une ve[y nattnal strategy. namely cummitting tu the fullucver
prire. already itpsets the result uf the 2 x 2 game.?l
Since N~ G Y;, the reader easilp verifies that the priur attaches ~usitive weight unlv tu
p;' and p!'. In fact, nsing the qttadratic payuff strurt~tre uf the game it can be established
that [,uth pla~~ers attach e~xartl~~ the same weight to the event that the up~unent will
cummit tu the leader ~rire. Clearlv, fur but.h players the best reply against the initial
hriur is tu wait, as in the analysis uf the fnll game and as uppused tu what hapYens in
the 2 x 2 game. In urder tu rumpute the risk duminant eqttilibrium we have to determine
again whu will switch first as Nlapers attach mure weight tu the event that the other
~layer will ~~ait. It tttrns unt that. if we wunld nut alluw the ~layers tu switch tu the
fulluwer ~rire (as in the 2 x 2 game); player 1 wuuld switch first and Lecome the prire
leader. Huwever, in the 3 x 3 game pla.Vers want tu switch away fivm t.heir waiting
strategti~ ta the safet' follvwel prlc'e~ at a mt(ch earlier point. in time. Each player will
switrh frum waiting tu his fulluwet' price when he becomes exactly indifferent behveen
these strategies. Since these strategies yield the same pavuff in case t.he uther cummits
tu his leader prire. the time at which players want. tu switch is determined bp the payuffs
in the 2 ri 2 game at the buttom right curner of the game of Table 4. Straightfonvard
cum}~~ttations yield that in fact plaper 2 will switch first. Henre, in the game uf Table
-! the eqttiliLrirtm in which the low cost firm is the ~rice leader and the high cust firm
fulluws is risk duminant, as in the fttll game.5
Tu sitrnmarize, there are three uL.jectiuns against the shortcttt analysis uf the 2 x 2
game. First. the redttced game dues nut take intu accvttnt all strakegies that are best
reylies fur sume initial sttL,jertive heliefs. Second, this implies that the bicentric priur
cum}~uted in that game is nut the right one. In the full game firms are always ttncertain
ahuttt the cummitment price uf the uppunent and, therefure, prefer to wait. Finally,
e~~en if we wottld runstntct the birentric ~riur Lased un the fiill game. but. again nse the
2 x 2 game tu determine whu will switch first and Lecume the price leader, we will get
the wrung resttlt. If firms can unly cummit tu the leader Yrire. the high cust firm wutild
-'Fur caample... (or par.imeters a- 0.6, q- 0.75 and r.l - 0.2.~ we fiud ihat plapcr I wutild switch
tu lii.~ tulluwer pric-r rct t-(1.12 aud tu his leader price ac t - 0.-11. For playca '1 the:;e valu~ xre,
rc..~pc~c~ticeh~. f- U.01 .cud t- 0.-1R.switrh first. Huwe~-er. firms wunld switrh earlier if the}- runld ttse a safer strateg~-, like
rumrnitting to the fulluwer price. Given that u~purtunit~., the luw rust firm r~-ill srcitrh
first and berume the prire leader.
6 Conclusion
In this pa~er we studied the strategir rhuire uf whether tu lead ur tu fullutr in a dttu~uh-
~rire cumYetitiun game with symmetricall}~ hurizuntally differentiated prudttcts and
where the fit'ms differ in their matginal custs. We analvsed a mudel in whirh firms
can decide tu move earlV ur late. The model has twu ~nre eqnilibria rorrespunding tu
the two possibíe role assignments and by using the risk duminance rriterion we were able
tu select amung these. Specifically, as waiting is mure risky for the efficient firm than
fur the firm wit-h the higher cost, the former will act as a price leader and the lattar
will uccupy the more }rreferred rule- Note that this dues nut necessaril,y impl}~ that the
largest firm will lead. The efficient firm has the largest market share if and unl}. if he
rharges the luwest prire and whether this hulds depends un the extent tu which the costs
differ. If the cust difference is small the efficient leader will have the higher price (hence
the smaller market share) and if the difference is large it will have the lowest ~rice (and
the larger market share). So our resttlts are in line wit.h the em~it'ical ubservatiun that
the ~rire leader is uften. bttt not always, the larger firm.`'
.4s cumpared tu the alternative randidate suhttion. where the least ef6cient firm leads,
the tutal ~rufits in the risk dominant equilibrittm are higher (since L2 f Ft ~ Ir f F2),
the di~-isiun uf the prufits is mure eqttal ( ~I,t - F2~ c ~I,2 - Ft~ ) and consttmer srtrplus
is luwer. Tu see why, cunsider first the case where p~- ~ p~- 1 Pz ~ P2 . Since pl - pZ 1
p~' - p~' une sees that when we gu frum Sz tu .St. the price decrease uf goud 2 is larger
than the ~rire inrrease uf goud 1. Sinre consnmers bn~. more of goud 2 than uf guod 1,
this means that the Lundle runsumed under ,Sl ran be buught tmder .St fur less mune}-.
~~-hirh of cuitrse im},lies that cunsttmers are better uff when firm 1 is the leader. The
filf the inefficieut firm were to lead. it wuuld certainh~ have the stnaller market share besan~ i[ ,ets
t.hr~ hiRLest prire. p~ ~ p1~.l:i
argitment fur the uther case tchet'e p~~ 7 pl ) p~ ) p1~ is similar. First note that the
guuds are cum~letelc s}~mmetric so that consumers are indifferent between the situatiun
uf .í'1 and the situatiun in which firm 1 charges pz and firm 2 charges p~. If we cumpare
the latrer sitnatiun with St we see that, since p~` - p2~ ~ p~' - pi, the price decrease uf
guud '2 is larger than the prire increase of guud 1 su that again cunsumers prefer firm 1
ru lead.
The cunchtsiun that the effirient firm will muve first appears to Le robust. In uiu
cum~aniun paYer (Van Damme and Hurkens (1996)) we derive it for the case uf quan-
titv cumYetitiun, Deneckere and Kuvenuck (1992) uLtained it fur the case uf capacity-
ronstrained yrire cumpetitiun and humugeneuns guods, and Cabrales et, al (1997) derived
the resnlt fur the case uf vertical pruduct differentiation, where firms first choose quaL-
ties and next cumyete in prires. This latter paper also makes use uf the concept uf risk
duminance. Litt it does nut derive the result analvtically: instead the authors resort to
mtmerical cumYntatiuns and simulatiuns. Tu uur knuwledge, the present paper, t.ugether
with its cumpaniun on quantity cumpetition, are the first applicatiuns of the (linear)
rraring Nrurednre tu games where the strategV spaces are not finite. We have seen that.
althuitgh there ma,}' Le sume cumputatiunal complexities, no new conceptual difficiilties
are encunntered- Of cuttrse, mure impurtant than this methudolugical aspect is the ap-
~arant ruLitstness result, itself, ~~~hich might ~rovide the theoretical tmderpinning fur the
uLsen.ed phenumenun in Yractise that frequently the duminant firm indeed acts as the
leader (Scherer and Russ (1990)).
`ute that ~~.e did nut pruvide the sulutiun uf the endogenuns timing game fur the
case ~~~here huth firms have the same marginal custs. The reader might cunjecture that
in that case the Bertrand eqitili~rium wonld be selected, i.e. that firms would muve
sim~dtaneoiisl}~, huwever, that ronjecrnre is wrung. Clearly, if the firms are rompletel,y
spmmetric, nune uf the prire leader eqitili~ria can risk dominate the other. Harsanyi
and Selten (1988) argue that in that case the sulution uf the game is the linear trare uf
the barycentric priur ip~' f lu~,. In Appendix A3 we shu~~- that the linear trace uf this
hriur is a mixed strategv equiliLrittm M where firms cummit with pusitive prubabilitytu sume prire p''r E(p''` , p~~) and wait with the remaining prubaLility. (See Pastine and
Pastine (1997) fur details abuitt this mixed eqnilibt'inm.) The intuitiun thar we du nut
end up at the Bertrand eqitilibrittm is simple: if the tracing path wuuld rum'erge rhere
rhen earh player wuiild have an inrentive tu wait (Lecause each firm wvuld expect the
uther to cummit tu a randum price) and that rannut Le an eqitilibrittm.
~ie du nut find this mixed equilibriitm solntiun very appealing. Fur example. ~ae
nute that that this eqitiliLrium is risk duminated Ly anv uf the príre leader eqniliLria.
Cumpare fur example this mixed equilibriitm with .5~. For z E(0. 1) the uniq~te Lest
reply fur playar 2 against zlll -I- (1 - r)St is to wait (since waiting is a Lest reply. against
Luth equiliLria). On the other hand, the Lest repl,y fur player 1 is tu cummit. sinre
rummitting tu 6t(~M) is strictl,y better than waiting. So the Licentric prior is that '2 will
wait and 1 will cummit. Hence, the tracing procedure ends up at ,St, which means that
h'~ risk duminates hl. Fnrt.hermore, the fully symmetric case is clearly vet}~ special and
the mixed equilibt'ittm sohrtion is driven Ly the complete symmetty. We nute that anv
small perturbation will get rid uf this sulution. Either the costs will be slightly diffet'ent.
and rhen we are Lack in the case analyzed in Section d, ur, alternatively-, there is a small
tremLle in the priur that is used in the tracing prucedure. It can Le shown that such a
tremble wuuld always lead tu one uf the price leadet' equilibria.~ Such lack uf roLustness
dues nut exist if custs are asymmetrir tu start with: Small pertiubatiuns in the priur
will nut change the uutcume.
The main result uf this paper alsu does not depend on the assumptiun t.hat there
are unly two points in time when the prices can putentially be chusen. Assume that
the market upens at time ~- 0, Lnt that firms rotild fix their price at anV time puint
I- 0. -1. -2. .... -T, with play.ers Leing cummitted tu a price once it has been chusen
and with pla}~ers being fiilly~ informed abuut the past historp.s The solutiun mav be
~We wuuld likr to iliank Andreu plati-('olell tor poiuting our attentiun to thi, issue.
x1'Li~ gawr in Nual~ uxl hi Itobnun (19!)Ol, where however it ic assumed t hat movin~ earlv is a~tiorixt ec1
wirh Ligher co,t eacl~ finu iucurv additioual ca,6 c(t) when it moveti aG time t, w-here c(-) is decreatiing
nud concer~iug to 0o a., 7 tends to -oo. It iti eatiily ,ec;n that, provided c(t)-c(1 } l) is suffieieutlv small.
the game onl~~ }ia~ ex{uilibria iu w.hich playen~ moce iu different periods. If hoth pla~~ers pre(er to lewddetermined L,t' Lack~~~ards inductiun, i.e. bv applying the sttbgame cunsistency Irrinci~le
frum Harsam'i and Selten (1988). It is cummon knuwledge that, unce the game reaches
time I --1 with nu cwnmitments being made, the efitcient firm will cummit tu p1~ while
rhe high cost firm will ~eait. Knowing this, at t c-I, both Irla~'ers find it in their interest
tu wait. The predicted untcume, henre~, is not sensitive tu the number of cummitment
heriuds: buth firms will make their price annottncements unly shurtly befure the market
u~ens, ~rirh rhe efficient finn making the annotmcement slightlti. earlier.
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A1
Let 'I, ~ lin(0. 1), Z,: - pe(Z) and v; - Var(Z~). We need to pruve v~ G vz. We will only~
itse that p'~(z) G p~(z) c 0.
- ~ ~ E', (~)~dz -
~.~~ P,(ti)~t~~ - ~ pz(z)~dz f ~~~ Pz(z)dz~a
,
- f ~,(4)~ - E~l(z)2]dz - (~ii - Itt)
- f [(n,(~-) - n~(~))(nt(~) ~~z(~))]rtz - (r~, - i~t)(r~, ~ ~~~)
- ~~ÍP,(~) -Pz(~)~~P~(ti) fp1(z) -ll~ -~zJdv
- ~(n, (~-) -n~(~))(f fÏ,~(t) t~z(r) -~~t - E~21d~)~ ~ ~ ~, ,
-~ f~;(t) - r~~(t)1[fz(P,(t) f n~(r) - ut -rzz)dc]~~
, ~
- ~- f f~',(~)-~z(ti)1[f (1',(r)-~nz(r)-r~,-~~z)dt~d;.
The first factur wit}tin the inte~al is positive. It sufitres to show that the second factor
is alsu nonnegati~-e. Well, the~ secund factor is eqnal tu zero for z- 0 and for ti- 1. The
resi,lt fullutivs once we have shuwn that the second factor is a cuncave fiinctiun uf z. The
first derivati~.e uf the serond factur (e.ith respect tu z) is
-li, f p,(~) -l~x f pz(-)
and the secund deri~.ative is
P,(~) f Ps(~) c 0.
O
A2
~~-e ptv~-e the three ineqitalities in (-1.2).
(~) 92(~.lii, ~,) ~ 9x(t.~il. v~).Pro[,j. Given espectations nrr -(t;l~.v), the optimal rommitment prire. p;(f) can
LP easil}~ rumpiited. The rompittations are almust identical tu the derivatiun of p~(t) in
(-1.1). and one finds




If !i c P~~ then b,(!z) ~ pF~ G P,~ and it fullows that p,(t) 1 G,(!r). L'sing the theurem uf
the maximiim, one now easily verifies that.
i~g~(rnr)
~! - a(1 - t)(P;(!) - Zt({r)) ? 0. (A.2)
Since pi' 7 Pi 7!i2 we have that pz(t) 1 62(!i~) ~ b2(!iz). It fullows from (A.2) that
9z(l,Fii,~i) ~9z(l,F~2,~i).
C
(~~) 92(l,li2,Ui~ ~ 9z(f,W1.v2).
I'rooj Again iising the theorem of the maximiim, one finds
~gà(~rnr) z --(1-t)a~a~0.
'r)v
Sinre v~ c v2, it fulluws from (A.3) that
O




9z(!, {i2, ~iÍ ~ J'z(!, F~2, ~z)-
--(I - r)(i -na(t) ~ a~) - i(I - n;(r) f Q(i ~ a~~(e~ t r:,)~~)
~~N,
~(1 - t)(I ~ a!~ - r:~)~~ - r-
~)r,;
~a~e-lfrs-a(1faPi(t)fc~)-tiN~~
P~(.!) - 6d(l~~) f t ~ ár,
(A.3)29
Taking the derivative uf the right-hand side ~a-ith respect tu t pields
ti r7y, z ~ ali - 1~- ~:, - a(1 -{- ap~(t) f r'a) r3N~
dt 8c; - (1 - a C~Z~P (t~ f - 2 ric;
- a(-16 f Saz - 2a'' - 2a~ -F 2a''r~~ - a5c~ - a~r~)











- t(p;(t) - c~)n~2 - 2at (~~ `)
-í - a'z
at f
- 2(4 - a2) l(d - az)(Pa(t) - ~;) - 4(P~ - c,)}
at
2(~1- az) (az`~ ~ 4(b~(Fz) - P;~)) ) 0
at
' 2(~! - az) ~(d - az)((hi(Ft) - c~) - ~(P~ - !',)}
The gain uf cummitting fur plaYer z is decreasing in c; and increasing in r~. Hence,
SI'z(ntz~~ t, r'2) ~ 9z(r~i2~~2, ~t )- Jt (tn2~rt. ~'2) - 9t (~nz)-
O
A3
~1'e shu~~- thar ~~-hen firms have identical custs the Harsanpi~Selten sulntiun uf the en-
dugenons timing game is a mixed eqttilibritim in which firms are indifferent between
rummitting and ~caiting and not the ~tne eqttiliLt'ium in which firms rommit themselves
tu the Bertrand eqttilibritim.
Let tn - ~p~~ f ~~u be the barycentric priur. Sttppose that for t sttfficiently close to
1 the eyitilitn'inm uf gt~"' is r~(t) -(1 - w(t))p(t) -~ tu(t)w, i.e. each firm waits with
Nrubabilit~~ tr(t ) and cummits a-ith prubability (1 - u~(k)) tu p(t). Hence, at t~layers'
ex~ertatiuns are gi~-en by rn~` -(1 - t)m f tr;(t). Cunsider the derivati~~e with respect tu3U
I uf the gain fimctiun y(m'). Because uf the em-elupe theorem the effect uf the (u}~rimal~





-(p(a) - r.)a ~-zp~ - ~ 1-~ a~(t) f ~~ ~(I -,r;(t))r~(r) t ~r,~t~ I t r,~(t) f r
~r,r~'(z)( i~ ri~p(t) f r. -
p(t))} 2
1 1 I f ap(t) - r~ 1 } np(t)- r
f ~ F f 2( 2 )-(I - au(t))( 2 )~ -~in(t)N
-tw'(t )(N - (1 -f- ap(t) - c)z)
2
If at t- 1 we wuitld have u~(I) - 0 and p(1) - p~`' then
t~t9(rn~)~ - ~pN - r')a(-Zpt~ - 2pN ~pN) f ~!'-,L 2N -- N
- 2(Q(pN - ~)(PN - pL) f F- N)
- 4a(pr - p~)(p~ -p~) ~ 0
i~-~
Sinre at f- 1 the gain to commit is zero, this means that firms will strictl,y prefer tu
w-ait at 1 G 1. Hence, the oiitcome of the tracing procedure cannut be the Bert.rand
equiliLriiim and must Le a non-degenerate mixed strategy equiliLrium. ~No. Author(s) Title
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